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This paper takes Brazilian data to an open economy DSGE model that 
features realistic aspects of fiscal policy in Brazil. The model incorporates 
primary surplus targets, cyclical expenditures and social programs in the 
form of public transfers, public investment and distortive taxation. We test 
for two competing specifications of the role of public capital in the real 
economy. Bayesian model comparison favors the infrastructure approach to 
public capital. The presence of non-Ricardian households allows fiscal 
policy shocks to affect real economy aggregates and distribution. The model 
is used to address questions regarding the effect of shocks to different fiscal 
policy instruments upon the business cycle. We also investigate whether 
recent fiscal policy in Brazil has exerted significant inflationary pressures.  
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1  Introduction 
 
The recent global financial crisis has brought fiscal policy back into spotlight. Facing 
major recession outlooks and approaching the zero lower bound of interest rates, 
developed economies have put forth significant fiscal stimuli as an attempt to boost 
economic recovery. In emerging markets, fiscal policy stimuli were also promptly set 
up to fight the recessionary risks of the crisis. In the specific case of Brazil, although the 
crisis abated much quicker than in developed economies (Figure 1), fiscal stimuli have 
not been completely withdrawn (Figure 2). 
 
For some time now there has been a local debate on whether and to what extent the 
recent expansionary stance of Brazilian fiscal policy, put in place during the recent 
crisis, could jeopardize the achievement of inflation targets. Advocates in favor of fiscal 
interventions often argue that not all the adopted fiscal measures are inflationary; public 
investments, for instance, could be favorable to balanced growth through the supply 
side. Notwithstanding, the local debate still lacks an analytical tool that can properly 
account for the intricate economic responses of both fiscal and monetary policies   
in action. 
 
This paper explores one possible tool for the analysis of fiscal and monetary policy in 
Brazil. We adapt a state-of-the-art open economy DGSE model to account for a more 
realistic setting of the fiscal policy from the standpoint of policy practice in Brazil. We 
bring the model to Brazilian data to investigate the dynamic responses of the economy 
to fiscal policy shocks and the effects of their interaction with monetary policy. The 
main questions we address are: 1) how does the type of fiscal expenditure matter for the 
business cycle?; 2) to what extent can an expansionist shock to the primary surplus put 
the accomplishment of central bank’s inflation target at risk?; and 3) has the conduct of 
fiscal policy in Brazil in recent years put pressure on inflation? 
 
The fiscal setting of the model departs from the tradition in the DSGE literature of 
addressing fiscal policy exclusively through lump sum taxes/transfers and a mean-
reverting rule for current government expenditures. First, we introduce a state-
dependent (net-of-interest) primary balance rule. With the implementation of an IMF  
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agreement back in 1998, Brazil committed to a primary surplus target that was intended 
to drive public debt to more sustainable levels in the long run. The target was to be 
complied with on a quarterly basis. The IMF agreement was renewed in 2001, amid a 
series of external and domestic shocks, including an energy shortage, and was extended 
and augmented in 2003. 
 
In December 2005, the Brazilian government made an early full repayment of the 
outstanding debt with the IMF. Such an act also implied that the targets set forth in the 
IMF agreement would cease to be enforced. Notwithstanding, the government 
understood that the market factored in a commitment to a debt-reducing primary surplus 
target as a good sign of sound fiscal management, thus improving sovereign credit 
ratings and alleviating the burden of new issuances of public debt. The Brazilian 
government then decided to keep on announcing primary surplus targets for the fiscal 
years, and in general enforced an anti-cyclic budget execution. 
 
The DSGE literature has experimented with some non-trivial state-dependent fiscal 
rules. In most cases, the preferred specification is based on rules for current government 
expenditures or taxes that respond to output and to debt
1. In practice, a government with 
targets for the primary balance makes concomitant decisions on all sorts of 
expenditures, revenues, transfers, subsidies, tax recovery and exemptions. The identified 
shocks to the primary surplus rule in our model are thus a summary measure of changes 
in policymakers’ preferences. 
 
The second adaptation we introduce in our model is to let the government intervene in 
the economy through the accumulation of public capital, with an impact on factor 
productivity and in the overall demand for investment goods. 
 
                                                 
1 Medina and Soto (2007) analyze three types of fiscal rules: one where government expenditures adjust 
to satisfy government’s budget constraint, another where government taxes do such as task, and the last 
one where government expenditures as a share of GDP adjust to meet a target for the “structural” balance, 
measured as the nominal fiscal result adjusted for cyclical revenues from government’s budget flow. 
Forni et. al. (2009) use tax rules that react to the debt-to-GDP ratio, and report that expenditure rules yield 
similar impact of the fiscal shocks to the economy. In CMS, lump-sum taxes are the chosen instrument to 
stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. Ratto et. al. (2009) introduce a rule for public investment that responds to 
the business cycle.  
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We test for two competing specifications of the way public capital affects factor 
productivity in Brazil. In the first specification, which draws from the work of Ratto et. 
al. (2009), we let public capital augment factor productivity at no direct cost for the 
firm. Public capital in this case can be interpreted as an externality to the private 
productive sector. As Macdonald (2008) points out, this is the most standard way of 
estimating production functions in economies with relevant public infrastructure, but it 
misses the important point that such expenditures are financed by society, and 
sometimes financing can be directly associated with the economic activity that is more 
intense on the use of such public capital goods. In our specification, financing of public 
capital is indirect, through the general tax system, and is not factored into the cost 
accounting of firms. 
 
In the second specification of the role of public capital in the economy, we assume that 
the costs associated with the use of public capital are born by its direct users, the 
intermediate goods firms. We also assume that, to a certain extent, firms can selectively 
choose between public and private capital services. This modeling choice was intended 
to capture the significant presence of the Brazilian government in the productive sector 
of the economy. In spite of a vast number of privatizations carried out over the past 
decades, Brazil still has a substantial number of mixed-capital firms (118 federal 
enterprises, as of January 2010) on top of high and increasing public loans to finance 
private capital
2. Some of these loans are extended with guarantees in the form of 
ownership transfers of funded capital to the government. Although this type of capital 
belongs to the government, it does not possess the characteristics of a public good: it is 
employed uniquely at the production of the individual firm and does not produce 
externalities to the other firms of the economy. 
 
To allow fiscal policy to have an effect on aggregate consumption, we follow Coenen, 
McAdam and Straub (2008), hereinafter referred to as CMS, and introduce non-
Ricardian agents in the model.
3 These agents are optimizing consumers, but, in addition 
to being constrained on their access to capital markets and investment choices, non-
                                                 
2 As of October 2010, total outstanding loans extended by public financial institutions amounted to 19.8% 
of GDP. 
3 Although the 59% of non-Ricardian agents calibrated for the domestic economy is higher than the 25% 
calibrated for the Euro Area, it is close to the 50% used in Galí et. al. (2004), and is substantially lower 
than the 70% considered for Chile in Medina and Soto (2007).  
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Ricardian agents in our model are less productive than the other group of agents. This 
assumption is necessary to allow for a steady state where different groups of workers 
can work the same amount of hours but earning different wages. 
 
The fourth novelty in our fiscal setup is the introduction of social programs in the form 
of transfers to the worse-off. For the past years, these programs have gained a lot of 
importance in the Brazilian policy agenda. The most popular program, “Bolsa Família”, 
has consisted of monthly transfers of public funds to about 11 million households   
in Brazil. 
 
The rest of the model follows the essence of the calibrated version of ECB’s New Area 
Wide Model presented in CMS. In addition to the changes we introduce in the fiscal 
setup and the assumption of labor heterogeneity, we modify the final goods price index 
and the recursive representation of wage setting decision rules and wage dispersion 
index
4, and introduce risk premia in the negotiation of foreign and domestic debt, the 
former playing an active role even in the steady state so as to account for the fact that 
real interest rates in Brazil are substantially higher than in the developed world. As in 
the estimated version of ECB’s NAWM presented in Christoffel, Coenen and Warne 
(2008), hereinafter referred to as CCW, our model features trending growth in   
labor productivity. 
 
We estimate the model using Bayesian methods. The data density favors the model that 
specifies public capital as an externality to firms. We use this model as benchmark to 
produce Bayesian impulse responses to the shocks in the model. From the IRFs, we 
show that: 1) the type of fiscal expenditures greatly matters for the business cycle; 2) 
fiscal shocks are usually inflationary; 3) fiscal policy preferences have not been 
identified as important drivers of the recent path of consumer inflation in Brazil; but 4) 
fiscal policy preferences have played an important role in the historical execution of the 
primary surplus. 
 
In addition, we conduct policy exercises and show that greater reaction of fiscal policy 
to deviations of public debt or GDP growth from their steady states can significantly 
                                                 
4 The details on the theoretical revisions can be found in Valli and Carvalho (2010).  
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destabilize the model’s dynamics. On the other hand, stronger reaction of the monetary 
authority to output growth produces muter responses to inflation and output after 
monetary policy shocks. 
 
Motivated by the policy debate about the possibility of reducing the primary surplus 
target in Brazil, we analyze the model’s dynamics under a drastic reduction in the target. 
We show that this would not enact significant changes in the dynamic responses of real 
and nominal variables of the model; however, and quite importantly, such a reduction in 
the target can only be accomplished if the ratio of public debt to GDP is also sharply cut 
down. Otherwise, the economy can undergo explosive paths. 
 
Our simulations also show that the presence of non-Ricardian agents has important 
implications for the responses of real variables to fiscal policy shocks, notwithstanding 
the fact that our non-Ricardian agents are intertemporal optimizers, yet with more 
restraints than the Ricardians. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the model. Section 
3 details the estimation procedure, reporting on the strategy for calibrating the steady 
state of the model, the reasons underlying the choices of priors, and also describing the 
data and the shocks. Section 4 analyses the impulse responses of the model and presents 
the historical decomposition of some key macroeconomic variables. Section 5 reports 
on some policy exercises. The last section concludes the paper. 
 
 
2  The model 
 
Figure 3 depicts the core structure of the model. The model is composed of two 
economies of different sizes that interact in goods and financial markets. The foreign 








The domestic economy has a continuum of households, which are grouped into two 
sets. The first, henceforth referred to as group     0, 1      , contains individuals 
with full access to savings technologies and with better labor skills. The other group, 
henceforth referred to as    1   ,1  , is composed of non-Ricardian agents who can 
smooth consumption intertemporally only by holding non-interest-bearing money 
balances. 
 
Household         chooses consumption  t i C ,  and labor services  t i N ,  to maximize the 
separable intertemporal utility with external habit formation 
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where   ,    and   ,    are shocks to consumption and labor preferences, the parameter 
  is the external habit persistence,   is the intertemporal discount factor,  1       is the 
intertemporal elasticity of consumption substitution, 1
      is the elasticity of labor effort 
relative to the real wage, and   is the depreciation rate of capital. 
 
Consumer i’s optimization problem is subject to the budget constraint  
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where, on the expenditure side,   , ,  is private investment in capital goods,   ,    are 
domestic government bonds,   ,   
   are foreign private bonds,    is the riskless free rate,  
10
  ,  is the interest rate on foreign bonds,    ,  and      ,  are risk premia over domestic 
and international bonds, respectively,  t S  is the nominal exchange rate,   ,  are money 
holdings, Ξ ,  is a lump sum rebate on the foreign risk premium, and Φ ,  is the stock of 
contingent securities negotiated within group I, acting as insurance against risks on 
labor income. In addition, Γ  ν ,   is a transaction cost on consumption and ν ,  is the 
money-velocity of consumption. On the earnings side,  W ,  is the wage earned by 
household i for one unit of labor services, K , ,  is the stock of private capital, u ,  is 
teady state nominal eΓ  u ,   is the cost of deviating from the steady state rate of capital 
utilization, R , ,  is the gross rate of the return on private capital, D ,  are dividends, and 
TR ,  are transfers from the government. Taxes are:   
  (consumption),   
  (labor 
income),   
   (social security),   
  (capital income),   
  (dividends) and   ,   (lump sum, 
active only for the foreign economy).  Price indices are   ,  and   , , the prices of final 
consumption and investment goods, respectively. Cost functions are detailed in the 
Appendix. 
 
The risk premium on internationally traded bonds follows: 
 
    ,        .exp        ,    , /                 ,       
    
  
  ∆          ,   
 
where  ∆  is the steady state change in the nominal exchange rate,    is the steady state 
foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio, and     ,  is a white noise shock. We let      correspond to 
a steady state risk premium that allows for country-specific real interest rates. To this 
end, we need to introduce the lump-sum rebate on the risk premium, Ξ , , so that these 
flows do not impact the balance of payments of the foreign country
5.  
 
The accumulation of private capital follows the equation: 
 
  , ,       1     , ,      ,   1   Γ  I , , /I , ,       , ,                (3) 
 
                                                 
5 For simplicity, we assume that  Ξ ,   Ξ  , .  
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where   , ,  is private investment,  Γ  is a cost to adjusting investment plans, and    ,  is a 
shock to investment efficiency. 
 
Households in group J are non-Ricardian agents that maximize a utility function 
analogous to (1), but are refrained from carrying out investment decisions, except for 
holding non-interest bearing money balances.  
 
Within each group, households compete in a monopolistically competitive labor market. 
By setting wage  t i W , , household i commits to meeting any labor demand  . ,t i N Wages are 
set à la Calvo, with a probability  ) 1 ( I ξ −   of optimizing each period. Optimizing 
households in group I choose the same wage  t i W,
~
, which we denote by  t I W ,
~
. Households 
that do not optimize readjust their wages based on a geometric average of past and 



























π . As the non-optimizing 
wage does not perfectly track the trend growth of the economy, there will be wage 
dispersion amongst households in the steady state
6.  
 
Household i’s optimization with respect to the wage  t i W ,
~
 yields the first order condition, 








































































































                                                 
6 Brazilian employers do not have a tradition of automatically readjusting wages based on output growth. 
For this reason, we did not include output growth as a component in the automatic wage readjustment 
rule. However, it is possible that the business cycle somehow affects the likelihood that firms allow for 







is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint, and  k t W e + ,  is, in the 
absence of staggering, a time varying markup of the real wage:   ,        ,     
 1      
 ￿
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t N  is households group I  aggregate labor demanded by firms, and  t I W ,  is 
household group I’s aggregate wage index. Superscripts in the labor variable represent 
demand. Subscripts represent supply. 
 
Wage setting in group J  is analogous to that of group I. The Calvo probability of 
readjusting wages is  ) 1 ( J ξ −  and all other group-specific variables are expressed with 






2.2  Production 
 
The productive sector of the economy comprises firms that produce tradable 
intermediate goods and non-tradable final goods. Price frictions are introduced only in 
the block of intermediate goods firms.  
 
 
2.2.1 Intermediate goods firms 
 
Continuums of firms, indexed by [] 1 , 0 ∈ f , employ capital and labor services to produce 
tradable intermediate goods  t f Y ,  under monopolistic competition. We introduce two 
alternative ways in which public capital affects private productivity. 
 
In the first specification, public capital augments factor productivity with no counterpart 
in input costs. We label it “infrastructure approach to public capital”. Under this 
approach, firm f’s production function is 
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t f N ,  are aggregate labor services,  
G




,  are 
private capital services, ψ  are fixed costs that ensure zero profit in the steady state, and 
t z  and  t zn  are respectively (temporary) neutral and (permanent) labor-augmenting 
productivity shocks. In equilibrium, 
H
t f t I
S H
t f K u K , ,
,
, =   where 
H
f K  is the stock of private 
capital used by firm f. 
 
In the second specification of the production function of intermediate goods, which we 
label “mixed-capital economy”, we follow Valli and Carvalho (2010) and  assume that 
firms competitively rent capital services from the government, 
S
t f G K , , ,  and from 
households in group I, 
S
t f H K , , , and transform them into the total capital input 
S
t f K ,
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where  g ω  is the economy’s degree of dependence on government investment and  g η  
stands for the elasticity of substitution between private and public capital services, and 
also relates to the sensitivity of demand to the cost variation in each type of capital.  
 
The production function in the mixed-capital economy becomes: 
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where, in equilibrium,  t f t I
S
t f K u K , , , = , where  t f K , is the stock of capital used by firm f. 
 
For a given total demand for capital services, the mixed capital firm minimizes the total 
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, min
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+         (9) 
 
subject to (7). 
 
The rental rate for private capital services results from the equilibrium conditions in the 
private capital market. The rental rate for government capital services also results from 
equilibrium conditions, this time in the market for government capital services, but, in 
steady state, we calibrate   in order to let the rental rate for public capital goods 
exclusively cover expenses with capital depreciation, so as to reproduce the fact that 
public capital is usually subsidized
7.  
 
                                                 
7 This assumption is also used in Macdonald (2008).  
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First order conditions to the problem of the mixed-capital firm yield the average rate of 
return on capital and the aggregate demand functions for each type of capital   
goods services: 
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All firms are identical since they solve the same optimization problem. The aggregate 
composition of capital services rented by intermediate goods firms can be restated by 
suppressing the subscript “f” from (7), using (10), and aggregating the different types of 








































Regardless of the approach to modeling public capital, we assume that firms rent labor 
services from groups with unequal labor skills. We assume that the individuals that are 
more constrained on their investment possibilities are also the ones with lower levels of 
labor skills. This modeling strategy allows for a steady state where skillful workers can 
earn more yet working the same amount of hours as the less skilled. In Brazil, labor 
contracts usually stipulate an 8-hour work-day. The freely negotiable terms in labor 
contracts are usually monthly nominal wages. The country is also globally known for its 
uneven income distribution. The same can be said for the distribution of labor income. 
According to the PNAD survey conducted by the Statistics Bureau (IBGE) in the year 
2007, individuals earning less than 2 minimum wages (equivalent to USD 195 per  
16
month at that time) amounted to 59.26% of the total economically active population. 
The other share of the population earned almost 3 times as much in average.  
 
The labor input used by firm f  in the production of intermediate goods is a composite of 
labor demanded to both groups of households. In addition to a population-size 
adjustment (ω ) to the firm’s labor demand, we add the parameter  [ ] ω ω 1 , 0 ∈ v  to 
introduce a bias in favor of more skilled workers. The resulting labor composite obtains 
from the following transformation technology 
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and where η  is the price-elasticity to demand for specific labor bundles,  I η  and  J η  are 
the price-elasticities for specific labor varieties. The special case when  1 = ω v  
corresponds to the equally skilled workers. 
 
Taking average wages ( t I W ,  and  t J W , ) in both groups as given, firms choose how much 
labor to hire by minimizing total labor cost 
J
t f t J
I
t f t I N W N W , , , , +  subject to (14). It 





























































Intermediate goods prices are set under monopolistic competition, with Calvo-type price 
rigidities. We assume local currency pricing. Let  t f H P , ,  and   t f X P , ,  be the prices for 
goods sold by firm f  in the domestic and foreign markets, with  H ξ  and  X ξ  denoting the 
probability that the firm will not optimize prices in each of these markets. Non-
optimizing domestic and foreign firms adjust their prices according to the rules 
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where  H π  and  X π  are domestic and foreign intermediate goods’ steady state inflation 
rates. 
 
Optimizing firms choose the prices  t f H P , ,
~
 and  t f X P , ,
~
 to maximize the expected 
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and nominal profits, net of fixed costs, are defined as 
 
( ) t f t t f H t f H H MC P D , , , , , − =   (24) 
 




Optimization is subject to the price indexation rule, to domestic and foreign demand for 
firm f’s goods,  t f H , and  t f X , , taking as given the marginal cost, the exchange rate and 
aggregate demand.  
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π ξ  
(27) 
 
where  t P e ,  represents a time-varying markup of prices in the absence of staggering, with 
  ,        ,       1      
 
        ,  , where   ,  is white noise. For simplicity we 
assume that the markup processes for both domestic and exported goods are the same. 
 
As firms are identical, they face the same optimization problem, choosing the same 
optimal price  t H t f H P P , , ,
~ ~
=  and  t X t f X P P , , ,
~ ~
= .  
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Pricing equations (26) and (27) can be restated recursively as  
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Aggregating over firms, domestic and export intermediate goods prices are 
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2.2.2 Final goods firms 
 
The economy has three firms producing non-tradable final goods. One specializes in the 
production of private consumption goods, another in public consumption goods, and the 
third in investment goods. Except for the firm that produces public consumption goods, 
all final goods’ producers combine domestic and imported intermediate goods in their 
production line.  
 
To produce private consumption goods, 
C
t Q , the firm purchases bundles of domestic 
C
t H  and foreign 
C
t IM  intermediate goods. To adjust its imported share of inputs, the 













C , ,  , where    ,   is an import demand shock.  
 
Letting  C ν  denote the bias towards domestic intermediate goods, the technology to 
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subject to the technology constraint (32) taking intermediate goods prices as given. 
 
The existence of an adjustment cost to the share of imported goods in the production of 
final goods invalidates the standard result that the Lagrange multiplier of the technology 
constraint equals the price index of final goods. The price index of private consumption 
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In general, first order conditions and equation (34) can be combined to yield the 
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The description of the model for investment goods is analogous, and the import demand 
shock that affects the cost to adjust the import basket is exactly the same.  
 
 
2.3 Fiscal authority 
 
The domestic fiscal authority pursues a primary surplus target  expressed in terms 
of GDP, levies taxes on consumption, labor, capital and dividends, makes biased 
transfers, and adjusts expenditures and budget financing accordingly. 
 
To account for the fact that the focal fiscal variable in Brazil is the (net-of-interest) 
primary balance, we introduce a rule for the primary surplus that responds to business 
cycle conditions and to the deviations of the public debt-to-GDP ratio from its   
steady-state:  
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g , the unindexed counterparts are steady-
state ratios, and  t sp, ε  is a white noise shock to the primary surplus. 
 
We introduce social programs in the form of biased transfers of public funds. Total 
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  (42) 
 
where tr is the steady state value of government transfers, and  t tr, ε represents a white 
noise shock.  
 
Government’s capital accumulation follows the equation 
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where    ,  is public investment and, for simplicity,   ,  is the same shock to the 
efficiency of investment that affects private capital accumulation. 
 
Government investment follows an autoregressive rule of the form 
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with     0  for the domestic economy. Equation (44) can be recast in terms of the 
primary surplus:  
 




− − − = t t t t RP t t M M B R e B SP   (45) 
 
The former expression makes it clear that, in this model, money not only has an 
effective role in real decisions, but also matters for the adjustment of fiscal accounts. 
Increased money supply can alleviate the financial burden from public debt, a feature 
that approximates the theoretical model to the real conduct of economic policy. 
 
As the primary surplus can also be stated as the difference between public revenues and 
expenditures, government consumption in this model will adapt endogenously so that 
the other fiscal instruments follow their stated rules. 
 
 
2.4  Monetary authority 
 
The monetary authority sets nominal interest rates and issues as much money as 
demanded by the public. To set interest rates, it follows a forward-looking rule that is 
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where  Π  is the annual inflation target, 
4 R  is the annualized quarterly nominal 
equilibrium interest rate, which satisfies  Π =
− .
4 4 β R ,  Y g  is the steady state output 
growth rate,  S Δ  is the steady state nominal exchange rate variation, and  t R, ε  is a white 




3  Bayesian Estimation 
 
We estimate the parameters for the domestic economy using Bayesian inference 
methods
9. Below are the procedures adopted to this end. 
 
 
3.1  Calibration 
 
First we stationarize the model so that the variables are expressed as shares of GDP. 
Except for hours worked, real variables are divided by real GDP to handle the unit root 
that arises from the permanent labor productivity shock and, in the case of the 
infrastructure approach to public capital, from the trend in public capital. Nominal 
variables are transformed to shares of nominal GDP as prices also trend due to our 
assumption of non-null steady state inflation.  
 
The foreign economy is entirely calibrated, following the parameterization presented  
in CMS. 
 
Some parameters of the domestic economy are calibrated. Following the standard 
procedure, price levels and capital utilization are normalized to 1, while profits and 
adjustment costs are set to zero. Some endogenous variables are calibrated so as to 
reproduce Brazilian historical averages during the inflation targeting regime (Table 1), 
and they consequently pin down the steady state values for most of the remaining 
endogenous variables of the model. 
 
Most of the parameters that affect the steady state of the model were also calibrated. 
Their values are shown in Table 2. In the absence of reasonable proxies in the literature 
for Brazil, some of these parameters were set at the same values as in CMS. A few 
others were calibrated to ensure that some desired relations hold in the steady state. The 
labor demand bias,  ω ν , for instance, was calibrated to ensure that households’ groups I  
                                                 
9 We use Dynare to conduct the log-linear approximation of the model to the calibrated steady state and to 
perform all estimation routines. We run 2 chains of 2 million draws of the Metropolis Hastings to 
estimate the posterior.  
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and  J work the same amount of hours. The home biases  C ν  and  I ν  were obtained from 
the demand equations of imported goods using the steady state value of consumption 
and investment goods, in addition to the quantum of imports. 
 
With the exception of consumption taxes, 
C τ , which were calibrated following Siqueira 
et. al. (2001), Brazilian tax rates were set based on the current tax laws. 
Notwithstanding, these laws allow for a great variety of exemptions and usually 
differentiate tax rates according to taxable bases. As such, they are not concise 
references for calibration. However, to our knowledge there is no aggregate data we 
could refer to for such a purpose, and so we chose the tax rates that are most   
commonly applied. 
 
We calibrated the price-elasticity to demand of government investment goods,  g η , to a 
value that is close to 1, arbitrarily approximating it to a Cobb-Douglas technology. This 
enabled us to calibrate  g υ  from the rental rate for government capital, which we 
assumed to be just enough to cover expenditures with depreciation. 
 
In lack of quarterly data on household distribution, the wage indexation parameter of 
non-Ricardian households was set so as to equal the estimated mean of the same 
parameter for Ricardian households. The Calvo-probabilities of price optimization in 
the intermediate goods sector,    and   , were also fixed, as attempts to estimate them 
resulted in a wide region of model indeterminacy. They were set at 0.30, a value that 
closely reflects the average price rigidity in Brazilian CPI-micro-data, which is of about 
1.3 quarters (Gouvea, 2007).  
 
 
3.2  The data 
 
We used the following (seasonally-adjusted) time series to estimate the parameters of 
the domestic economy: 
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•  Consumer inflation   , : quarterly inflation of the IPCA (Índice de Preços ao 
Consumidor Amplo – IBGE); 
 
•  Nominal interest rate   : quarterly effective nominal base rate (Selic); 
 
•  Total investment  
  ,   
  ,    
  :  seasonally adjusted quarterly nominal flows of 
gross fixed capital formation and inventory change in the national accounts as a 
share of quarterly GDP; 
 
•  Exports  
  ,   
  ,    
  : seasonally adjusted quarterly nominal flows of exports in 
the national accounts as a share of quarterly GDP; 
 
•  Exports inflation   , : quarterly inflation rate of Brazilian export prices 
calculated in USD by Funcex; 
 
•  Exports  
   ,    
  ,    
  : seasonally adjusted quarterly nominal flows of imports 
in the national accounts as a share of quarterly GDP; 
 
•  Private consumption 
  ,   
  ,    
  : seasonally adjusted quarterly nominal flows 
of household consumption in the national accounts as a share of quarterly GDP; 
 
•  Government consumption 
  ,   
  ,    
  : seasonally adjusted quarterly nominal 
flows of government expenditures in the national accounts as a share of 
quarterly GDP; 
 
•  Installed capacity utilization   , : quarterly capacity utilization published by 
FGV, normalized using the average of the series;  
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•  Exchange rate variation   
    
  : quarterly nominal BRL/USD exchange rate 
variation; 
 
•  Primary surplus    : seasonally adjusted primary surplus of the consolidated 
government (methodology that does not include Petrobrás in the public sector
10) 
as a share of GDP. 
 
The data were sampled from the inflation targeting period in Brazil (1999:Q1 to 
2010:Q2). From 1994 to 1998, although inflation was low, monetary policy followed a 
fixed exchange rate band regime. To avoid contamination of estimations with such an 
important structural break, we chose to use the smaller sample. 
 
As Guerron-Quintana (2007) pointed out, the data set chosen for the estimation matters 
for parameter identification. In our attempt to include the most number of series 
available, we noticed that the inclusion of monetary aggregates and available labor 
market series destabilized the estimations, and maximization algorithms could generally 
not find any optimum. We thus chose to exclude them from our data sample.  
 
 
3.3  Shocks 
 
We estimate the model with the following shocks: 
 
•  Total factor productivity,   
 
•  Labor productivity,    
 
•  Consumption preferences,    
•  Monetary policy,    
 
•  Primary surplus,     
 
•  Public transfers,     
                                                 
10 As the series for the primary surplus excluding Petrobrás is only available from 2002:Q1 on, we 
regressed the series with and without Petrobrás using the sample when both are available to obtain an 
estimate of the primary surplus without Petrobrás for the period 1991:Q1 to 2001:Q4.  
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•  Gap between domestic and foreign 
labor productivity,      
 
•  Foreign risk premium,      
 
•  Domestic risk premium,     
 
•  Import bias,     
 
•  Government investment,      
 
 
•  Investment efficiency,    
 
•  Wage markup,    
 
•  Price markup,    
 
The shock to labor preferences,   , was too poorly identified in the initial rounds of 
estimation and was dropped from the final estimation reported in this paper. 
 
Except for monetary policy and primary surplus shocks, which are white noise, all other 
shocks follow AR processes that converge to a steady state. In the mixed-capital 

























where  gy is the steady state output growth, which also equals the steady state rate of 
labor productivity under this approach to public capital. In addition,  t zn, ε  is an 
exogenous white noise process. We also assume that the normalized labor-augmenting 
technology shock in the domestic economy can temporarily deviate from that of the 
foreign economy: 
 
t rzn t rzn rzn rzn rzn
t
t
t rzn e e
zn
zn
e , 1 ,
*
















zn =  and  t rzn, ε  is a white noise shock. 
  
30
For the infrastructure approach to public capital, there are two sources of trending 
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and the difference in the normalized shock to domestic labor productivity from that in 
the foreign economy follows: 
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The steady state of the shocks to the wage and price markups are respectively 

 and  

 . Measurement errors were also included for national accounts series, as, in addition 
to suffering from substantial and frequent revisions, these series do not incorporate 
federal companies’ financial flows into government accounts.  
 
 
3.4  Estimation 
 
The parameters were estimated after the model was log-linearized around the steady 
state. Table 3 shows prior and posterior moments.  
 
For the choice of prior means, we used information from Brazilian-specific empirical 
evidence, whenever available, or took an agnostic stance of setting the priors at the 
center of traditionally chosen distributions or at the mode of the posteriors reported for 
the Euro Zone in CCW. In general, our priors were more diffuse than those in CCW. 
Below is a more detailed description of the priors we set based on Brazilian data:   
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•  The priors for the coefficients in the primary surplus rule were set at the point 
estimates of the partial-equilibrium regression shown in Valli and Carvalho 
(2010), run on a sample from 1996 to 2009. 
 
•  For the monetary policy rule, our prior means were set at the point estimates of 
the Taylor rule presented in Minella and Souza-Sobrinho (2009)
11.  
 
•  The prior means for the autoregressive components of the shocks were 
agnostically set at 0.5, corresponding to the center of beta or uniform 
distributions in the [0,1] interval. The only exception was the shock to the wage 
markup, with a mean set at the NAWM mode.  
 
The estimated data density favored the model where public capital is taken as an 
externality to firms (the infrastructure approach). For the same choice of priors we have 
just described, excluding the exchange rate component in the Taylor rule, the Lapplace 
approximation to the log data density of the mixed capital model was 977.77, compared 
to 1003.65 obtained under the infrastructure approach. In the analysis that follows, we 
report the estimates of the model under the infrastructure approach to public capital, 
assuming that there is an exchange rate component in the Taylor rule. 
 
Figure 4 shows plots of the prior and posterior distributions for each estimated 
parameter, and Figure 5 shows convergence diagnostics. Some of the shapes of the 
posteriors are not well behaved (sometimes non-smooth or multimodal) in spite of a 
reasonable number of draws in each chain of the Metropolis Hastings algorithm
12. The 
analyses that follow are based on the posterior means as calculated in the standard code 
of Dynare.  
 
                                                 
11 Our policy rules were estimated with only one lag in the policy instrument. The prior mean for the 
autoregressive components were thus set as the sum of the point estimates of the two lags in the 
individual regressions we just mentioned. 
12 So far, the computational resources available to this project have not allowed us to successfully handle 
estimates with a much greater number of draws.  
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The estimated means suggest that price and wage indexation in Brazil is substantially 
higher than in the Euro Zone
13.  Notwithstanding, monetary policy in Brazil is much 
more responsive to deviations of inflation from the targets. The response to output 
conditions is practically null, a result that was also obtained in partial-equilibrium 
regressions presented in Minella and Souza-Sobrinho (2009). Still compared to the Euro 
Zone, the autoregressive component of the rule in our estimations is much higher, and 
we also find a significant, yet small, response of the policy rate to exchange   
rate variations.  
 
The estimated primary surplus rule is less responsive to the public debt than suggested 
by the partial equilibrium regression presented in Valli and Carvalho (2010). The fiscal 
response to the business cycle is practically negligible. As such, the fiscal rule is very 
close to a simple autoregressive rule, with a moderate autoregressive component (0.55). 
Inertia in public investment is relatively high (0.786), contrasting with the low 
regressiveness of public transfers (0.332).  
 
 
4  Impulse Responses and Shock Decomposition 
 
 
4.1  Impulse responses to fiscal Shocks 
 
Figures 6 to 8 show impulse responses to shocks to fiscal variables in the model. The 
median responses are shown in bold lines, within the 90% confidence interval plotted 
with thinner lines, drawn from the posterior distribution. The shocks are in the 
magnitude of a 1 standard deviation from the steady state of the variables they directly 
affect.  
 
An expansionist shock to the primary surplus (as a share of GDP) leads to increases in 
both government consumption and public investment (both in levels and as shares of 
GDP). This heats the economy as intermediate goods firms attempt to meet the 
increased demand for their goods. Firms are able to hire more labor, under a marginal 
                                                 
13 We take CCW as a reference for Euro Zone estimates.  
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reduction in real wages. This triggers an expansion in private consumption, which, 
together with the rise in government consumption, sustains output levels above the trend 
for over a year. The increased demand for consumer goods allows for the pass-through 
of the intermediate goods inflation to consumer prices, and thus consumer inflation 
rises. Monetary policy reacts to the inflationary conditions expected for the future and 
helps bring inflation back to the steady state. The interest rate reaction is not too intense 
because of the forward lookingness of the rule. Most of the effects of the primary 
surplus shock, including that on output, fade out within two years. The increase in the 
ratio of public debt to GDP, however, is very long-lasting. 
 
An expansionist shock to government transfers (as a share of GDP) also has short-lived 
effects but the cycles it creates are quite different from those of the primary surplus 
shock. The transfers shock requires a strong reduction in government consumption and 
public investment (both as a share of GDP) so that the primary fiscal rule is fulfilled. As 
the transfers are biased towards the population that has restricted access to investment, 
consumption in this group rises above the trend. Yet, the increase in private 
consumption is not enough to ensure output expansion upon impact of the shock. It is 
only when government consumption returns to the steady state and thus stop depressing 
the demand for intermediate goods that output can take advantage of the greater demand 
from consumers and momentarily peaks above the trend. The shock to transfers has a 
mild and short-lived inflationary impact, likely due to the fact that the autoregressive 
component of the transfer rule is low, allowing the shock to dissipate fast. 
 
An expansionist shock to government investment (as a share of GDP) requires a 
significant reduction in the ratio of government consumption to GDP so that the primary 
surplus rule is fulfilled. However, as the output strongly accelerates from the increased 
demand for intermediate goods to produce investment goods, detrended levels of 
government consumption fall only in the initial quarters, recovering soon after. The 
boost in output helps reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio, and the primary fiscal rule can also 
act so as to enact expansionary effects upon the economy. A heated labor market allows 
for a substantial increase in private consumption, with an important inflationary impact. 
The impact on CPI inflation is much stronger than that observed after a shock to the  
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primary surplus, but it fades out a little faster. The effects on real variables, including 
those on output, are long-lasting. 
 
 
4.2   Impulse responses to the other shocks 
 
Figure 9 shows the impulse response to a monetary policy shock. As expected, the 
shock drives output down, by depressing investment and private consumption. Firms cut 
down on their demand for labor, and employment falls. The rise in interest rates puts 
pressure on the debt service, which in turn requires a reduction in government 
consumption that further dampens output. The nominal exchange rate appreciates. All 
these effects result in a drop of intermediate goods inflation, passing through to 
consumer prices. The trough in inflation is in the first quarter after the shock hits   
the economy.  
 
It is not clear what one should expect for the shape of the response of consumer 
inflation to a monetary policy shock in Brazil. Figure 10 replicates the responses 
obtained in Minella (2001), where he estimates a monthly VAR for the period 1994:09 
to 2000:12 with standard endogenous variables in addition to the country risk premium. 
All of the responses are hump-shaped, but the trough occurs within the first three 
months after the shock. However, if we update the estimations to include the most 
recent data, the responses show a price puzzle in the first three months, and the trough is 
achieved later, in the sixth month (Panel A of Figure 11). If we use the same set of 
endogenous variables to estimate a quarterly VAR imposing the same ordering as in 
Minella (2001), we obtain greater uncertainty in the responses, with the central 
prediction indicating troughs in the 2
nd and 5
th quarters (Panel B of Figure 11).  The 
shape of the response also considerably changes if we replace industrial production by 
GDP in the set of regressors (Panel C of Figure 11). In this case, the evidence of a price 
puzzle remerges and the trough of the response distinguishably occurs in the 5
th quarter. 
Finally, if we replace the country risk premium for the nominal exchange rate in the set 
of regressors (Panel D of Figure 11), we find a completely different response where 
inflation does not drop after a shock to the exchange rate.  
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Figure 12 shows the impulse responses of a shock to the domestic risk premium. The 
shape of the responses resemble those of a monetary policy shock, as, similarly to the 
shock to the interest rate, the shock to the domestic risk premium represents a higher 
cost of borrowing to the government and a higher opportunity cost for investment. After 
the shock, the monetary policy instrument is fine-tuned to try to counterbalance the 
contractionist impact of the shock to the domestic risk premium. 
 
Figure 13 shows the impulse responses of a shock to the foreign risk premium. It first 
transmits through the UIP, and as the shock hits, the exchange rate depreciates. 
Favorable terms of trade help boost exports and dampen imports, causing output to rise 
up above the trend. Greater labor demand helps private consumption to increase. 
Demand pressures feed through intermediate and consumer prices, and monetary policy 
reacts to get inflation back on the steady state. 
 
Figure 14 shows the impulse responses to a temporary total factor productivity shock. 
On impact, the shock allows firms to cut down on their (nominal) marginal cost and on 
labor demand. As the prices of intermediate goods are set as a markup over marginal 
costs, they fall after the shock hits. Their passthrough to the GDP deflator implies a 
slight increase in real wages. Both factors, price drops and real wage increases, are 
factored into consumer decisions, and thus private consumption rises. Price drops of 
intermediate goods are also translated into reductions in export prices, partially 
compensated by a depreciated exchange rate. The rise in demand from consumers, 
investors and exporters allows output to enact a substantial expansion, so high as to 
allow government consumption to rise above the trend yet keeping its share to GDP 
below the steady state for a number of quarters.  
 
In contrast, a shock to permanent (labor-augmenting) productivity (Figure 15) implies a 
rise in firms’ demand for labor, putting pressure on real wages. The rise in marginal 
costs and the increased demand for final consumption and investment goods translate 





4.3  Historical decomposition 
 
Figure 16 shows the historical decomposition of key macroeconomic variables in Brazil 
during the inflation targeting regime. As the plots with all shocks to the model are 
visually messy, we chose to depict only the shocks that mostly impacted each series.  
 
Monetary policy shocks, which are traditionally interpreted as shocks to policymakers’ 
preferences, have played a minor role in the setting of nominal interest rates in Brazil. 
Overall, shocks to firms’ productivity, domestic risk premium and price markups have 
been more influential in the setting of the monetary policy rate.  
 
Productivity shocks have also played a significant role in the cycles of consumer 
inflation, primary surplus to GDP and consumption to GDP.  As the model implies 
close correspondence of (permanent) labor-productivity shocks in the domestic and 
foreign economy, it is customary to interpret these shocks as a transmission channel of 
global shocks to the domestic economy. The importance of such shocks in the 
decomposition of historical series should thus be reflecting the fact that Brazil has been 
often hit by a number of shocks stemming from abroad. 
 
Aside from technological shocks, the domestic risk premium and price markup shocks 
have also been highly influential to inflation in Brazil. The plots suggest that, more 
recently, price markups have been the main upward-pressing force to consumer inflation 
in the country.  
 
As to the primary surplus to GDP, fiscal policy shocks have been quite important as 
well. Until 2003, the shocks to fiscal preferences were usually in the direction of 
enacting expansionist policies so as to countervail the contractionist impact of 
productivity shocks. This reversed in 2004, and from then to a few months after the 
global financial crisis of 2008, fiscal policy preferences were contractionist. The crisis 
triggered the reversal of fiscal policy preferences towards expansionist decisions. 
Moreover, domestic risk premium shocks have put substantial downward pressure to 
primary surpluses.  
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As to private consumption (as a share of GDP), expansionist shocks were mainly 
technology shocks and shocks to public transfers and public investment, especially after 
2003, coinciding with the presidential term of Mr. Lula. The domestic risk premium 
was the main shock pushing consumption downwards. 
 
 
5  Policy exercises 
 
Figures 17 to 21 show policy exercises carried out with simulations of the model at the 
mean of the estimated posterior distribution of the parameters.  
 
After the global financial crisis in 2008, the Brazilian government has systematically 
attained lower than targeted primary surpluses. In 2010, amid presidential elections, the 
future maintenance of the target levels was even called into question. Figure 17 shows 
what would happen to the main dynamics of the economy should the target for the 
primary surplus be drastically cut down to 1.5% of GDP. The dynamic responses of 
output and inflation would not post relevant changes under the parameterized model. 
However, for this new target to be sustainable, which is to say in other words that for 
the model to have a well-defined equilibrium, the public debt to GDP ratio should be 
cut off in more than half. 
 
Figure 18 shows what one can expect for the model dynamics if the government 
increases its commitment to the steady-state level of public debt as a share of GDP. If 
the response to the debt in the fiscal rule increases almost tenfold, from the estimated 
0.017 to 0.10, the same expansionist shock to the primary surplus rule causes output to 
initially expand by the same amount, yet returning to the steady state a little more 
sluggishly. Inflation rises a little more and is also a little more persistent to return to the 
steady state. The most pronounced change is in the public debt path, which reverses 
back to the steady state a lot faster. If the response to debt in the fiscal rule is increased 
to 0.20, the dynamic responses of the model become highly cyclical, reaching regions of 
indeterminacy for values of the debt coefficient in the fiscal rule higher than 0.20. 
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Figure 19 shows an analogous exercise, where instead we change the response of the 
fiscal rule to output growth. Increasing the reaction of the primary surplus to output 
growth from 0.038 to 0.10 causes relatively little changes in the dynamics of output, 
inflation, debt and the primary surplus. However, if the reaction hikes to 0.50, the 
dynamic responses of the model to a primary surplus shock become extremely cyclical. 
 
On the other hand, if the monetary authority chooses to react more to output growth 
(Figure 20), contractionist shocks to the interest rate generally produce muter   
dynamic responses.  
 
We also conduct exercises changing the share of non-Ricardian agents in the population 
(Figure 21). We find an important sensitivity of the dynamics of real variables to this 
feature of the model. The lower the share of non-Ricardian agents, the muter the 
responses of real variables to a fiscal shock to the primary surplus. This result is in line 
with the literature. In Galí et. al. (2004), the sensitivity of aggregate consumption 
responses to a government spending shock is attributed to the presence of rule-of-thumb 
consumers, calibrated at 50%, and to the presence of sticky prices. Notice, however, that 
in our model non-Ricardians make intertemporallly optimal decisions, yet under 
restrained investment options.  
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6  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we employ Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of the Brazilian 
economy, modeled as an open-economy where fiscal policy is implemented through a 
rich set of instruments: primary surplus, public investment, and social transfers. There 
are both Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents, rendering fiscal policies important driver 
of business cycles.  
 
We show that the dynamic responses of the model are sensitive to the fiscal instrument 
that is being shocked. In general, the responses of real variables, including GDP, to 
shocks to the primary surplus or to public transfers fade out before the end of the second 
year. On the other hand, shocks to public investment are much longer lived. The path 
undertaken by fiscal variables also depends on the type of the shock. Expansionist 
shocks to the primary surplus are executed through increases in both government 
consumption and investment whilst expansionist shocks to public transfers are 
accompanied by reductions in public consumption and investment so that the primary 
surplus rule is fulfilled. All fiscal shocks are inflationary.   
 
We decompose the main macroeconomic series in Brazil during the inflation targeting 
regime into the estimated shocks of the model. We find that technology shocks have 
been important drivers of real and nominal variables. However, other shocks have 
played relevant roles as well.  
 
The setting of the monetary policy rate, for instance, has been significantly affected by 
the domestic risk premium and price markups. Interestingly, the shocks to policy 
preferences have not been important drivers of interest rates in Brazil.  
 
For the execution of the primary surplus, however, the opposite holds. We find that until 
2003, fiscal policy preferences were usually in the direction of enacting expansionist 
policies. This reversed in 2004, and from then until a few months after the global 
financial crisis of 2008, fiscal preferences were contractionist. After the crisis, fiscal 
policy preferences reversed again towards expansion following the global trend of 
fighting the crisis with fiscal incentives. In addition to policy preferences, shocks to the  
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domestic risk premium have also exerted important expansionist pressures on the 
execution of the primary surplus.  
 
Private consumption (as a share of GDP) has also been importantly affected by 
expansionist shocks to public transfers and public investment, especially after 2003, 
coinciding with the presidential term of Mr. Lula. The domestic risk premium shock 
was the main dampening force to consumption.  
 
Historical decomposition of consumer inflation does not show a relevant participation 
of policy shocks. Aside from technology shocks, the main drivers of consumer inflation 
in Brazil have been the domestic risk premium and price markups.  
 
We also conduct simulations with the estimated model so as to assess the dynamic 
impact of policy changes. In the first exercise, we show that a substantial cut in the 
primary surplus target does not imply substantial changes in the model’s dynamics. 
However, such a drastic policy change can only be accomplished with a substantial 
restructuring of the public debt, with a reduction in its level by more than 50%. 
 
In the second exercise, we show that too strong responses of the fiscal rule for the 
primary surplus to deviations of the public debt or GDP growth from their steady states 
can significantly destabilize the model economy, introducing important cyclicalities in 
real and nominal variables. 
 
In the third exercise, we show that should the Brazilian monetary authority decide to 
increase its reaction to output growth, the responses of both inflation and output to 
monetary policy shocks will be muter.  
 
Finally we show that a reduction in the share of non-Ricardian agents in the model 
produce muter responses of the fiscal shock to the primary surplus upon aggregate 
consumption and real wages. This result is regardless of the fact that in our model non-
Ricardian agents are intertemporal optimizers, yet with more restraints regarding their 
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We describe below the functional form for each of the cost functions in the paper. 
 
Consumption transactions cost: 
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Cost on the utilization of capital: 
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where  Y g  is the trend growth rate of the economy. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Steady State Ratios for the Brazilian Economy 
Model 
variable 
Description Calibrated  value 
 ,     Consumer inflation, inflation target  4.92% p.y. 
   Output growth  2.5% p.y. 
      ⁄   Government investment  1.86% of GDP 
      ⁄   Primary surplus  3.38% of GDP 
 /    Money balances  16.1% of GDP 
  
      ⁄   Net foreign debt  -16.33% of quarterly 
GDP 
   ⁄   Real interest rate  7.5% p.y. 
 	     ⁄   Private consumption  61.8% p.y.  
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Table 2: Calibrated parameters for Brazil 
Parameter  Value  Description  Source of calibration 
 
A.  Households 
     1.0                Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution    Log-linear utility     
     2.0          Inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply      ECB NAWM (CMS)    
     0.025                Depreciation rate              ECB NAWM (CMS)    
    0.59260   Size  of  household  J        Brazil’s  PNAD  survey  2007    
  ,   ,     0.765, 0.75            Fraction of households not setting wages optimally each quarter  NAWM (CCW, CMS)   
β              0.9882                         Intertemporal discount factor                                                            To obtain 7.5% p.y. real interest rate 
sz    0.0053     Relative size of the domestic economy         To fulfill the trade balance equation 
B.  Intermediate-good firms 
     0.3      Share of capital income in value added         ECB NAWM (CMS)      
    1.0    Stationary  total  productivity  level      ECB  NAWM  (CMS)     
     6.0          Price elasticity of demand for labor bundles       ECB NAWM (CMS)      
      6.0      Price elasticity of demand for labor of household I    ECB  NAWM  (CMS)     
      6.0      Price elasticity of demand for labor of household J    ECB  NAWM  (CMS)     
      0.003                Labor demand bias                         
C.  Final-good firms 
      0.875      Home bias in the production of consumption final goods    To fulfill steady state equations   
      0.731      Home bias in the production of investment final goods    To fulfill steady state equations   
     6.0      Price elasticity of demand for the intermediate-good variety  ECB NAWM (CMS)      
D.  Fiscal authority 
     0.162    Consumption  tax  rate        Siqueira,  Nogueira,  Souza  (2001) 
     0.15    Dividend  tax  rate        Tax  law  (general  terms)    
     0.15    Capital  income  tax  rate       Tax  law  (general  terms)     
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     0.15    Labor  income  tax  rate        Tax  law  (general  terms)   
  ￿    0.11      Rate of social security contributions by households     Tax law (general terms)     
  ￿    0.20      Rate of social security contributions by firms      Tax law (general terms)     
      1.001      Elasticity of substitution between private and public investment goods  Cobb-Douglas technology 
        
E.  Adjustment and transaction costs 
  ,    0.15    Parameter  of  transaction  cost  function     ECB  NAWM  (CMS)     







Table 3: Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Estimated Parameters 
 








mean mean distrib SD
Autoregressive parameters
rhz ρZ Temporary technology 0.991           0.976        1.000        0.500              unif 0.29          
rhzn ρzn Labor (permanent) productivity 0.836           0.810        0.860        0.500              unif 0.29          
rhrzn ρrzn Gap between labor productivities 0.989           0.976        1.000        0.500              unif 0.29          
rhtr ρtr Public transfers 0.332           0.283        0.374        0.500              beta 0.20          
rhig ρig Public investment 0.786           0.754        0.835        0.500              beta 0.20          
rhzec ρεc Consumption preferences 0.432           0.406        0.457        0.500              beta 0.10          
rhzeim ρεim Import demand 0.475           0.447        0.501        0.500              beta 0.10          
rhzei ρzei Investment efficiency 0.478           0.459        0.496        0.500              beta 0.10          
rhzerp ρεrp Domestic risk premium 0.449           0.424        0.469        0.500              beta 0.10          
rhzemkw ρεw Wage markup 0.670           0.645        0.689        0.670              beta 0.10          
rhzemkp ρεp Price markup 0.470           0.438        0.508        0.500              beta 0.10          
Fiscal rule
phby φBy Debt stabilization coefficient 0.017           0.012        0.024        0.041              norm 0.40          
rhsp1 ρsp Autoregressive coefficient 0.550           0.518        0.579        0.500              unif 0.29          
phspgy φsp,gy Business cycle coefficient 0.038           (0.003)       0.091        0.0 norm 0.20          
Monetary policy rule
phm φπ Inflation deviation to the target 2.850           2.805        2.895        1.570              norm 0.40          
phr1 ρR1 Autoregressive coefficient 0.761           0.724        0.795        0.490              unif 0.28          
phgy φgy Business cycle coefficient 0.023           (0.007)       0.065        0.500              norm 0.40          
phins φe Exchange rate variation (0.012)          (0.020)       (0.005)       0.0 norm 0.10          
Preferences
kp κ Habit persistence 0.579           0.566        0.592        0.566              beta 0.05          
Pricing parameters
chi χI Wage indexation 0.915           0.892        0.938        0.635              beta 0.20          
chh χH Price indexation (Domestic goods)0.786           0.759        0.816        0.417              beta 0.20          
chx χX Price indexation (Export goods)0.912           0.887        0.939        0.498              beta 0.20          
Home bias
mic μic Consumption goods 0.748           0.682        0.798        1.943              norm 0.40          
mii μii Imported goods 1.483           1.427        1.544        1.595              gamm 0.25          
Parameters of the cost functions
gmi γI Investment efficiency 2.353           1.859        3.031        5.169              gamm 2.00          
gmimc γIMc Import adjustment (consumption goods)6.076           5.722        6.662        5.596              gamm 2.00          
gmimi γIMi Import adjustment (investment goods)0.153           -             0.412        0.404              gamm 2.00          
Risk premium parameter
gmbf1 γRPF,1 Debt stabilization coefficient 0.043           0.023        0.061        0.500              unif 0.29          







mean mean distrib SD
Standard deviation of shocks
εR Monetary policy 0.022           0.017        0.025        0.100              invg 2.00          
εZ Temporary technology 0.028           0.022        0.035        0.100              invg 2.00          
εzn Labor (permanent) productivity 0.031           0.024        0.037        0.100              invg 2.00          
εrzn Deviation to foreign labor productivity 0.099           0.057        0.139        0.100              invg 2.00          
εtr Public transfers 0.018           0.015        0.021        0.100              invg 2.00          
εsp Primary surplus 0.017           0.014        0.020        0.100              invg 2.00          
εig Public investment 0.015           0.012        0.017        0.100              invg 2.00          
εc Consumption preferences 0.093           0.062        0.126        0.100              invg 2.00          
εrpf Foreign risk premium 0.143           0.102        0.185        0.100              invg 2.00          
εim Import demand 0.115           0.090        0.147        0.100              invg 2.00          
εi Investment efficiency 0.103           0.054        0.145        0.100              invg 2.00          
εrp Domestic risk premium 0.047           0.027        0.064        0.100              invg 2.00          
εw Wage markup 0.044           0.025        0.062        0.100              invg 2.00          
εp Price markup 0.027           0.021        0.033        0.100              invg 2.00          
SD of measurement errors
Investment expenditures 0.002           0.000        0.004        0.001              invg 2.00          
Exports expenditures 0.009           0.007        0.010        0.001              invg 2.00          
Private consumption expenditures 0.001           0.000        0.002        0.001              invg 2.00          
Imports expenditures 0.001           0.000        0.001        0.001              invg 2.00          




Figure 1: Brazilian GDP 
 
 
Figure 2: Selected Fiscal Expenditures and Public Banks’ Loans in Brazil 
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Figure 4: Prior and Posterior Distributions 
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Figure 10: Replication of Figure 10 in Minella (2001): Responses to an Interest 
Rate Shock Using Monthly VAR estimation Including Country Risk Premium 






Figure 11: Consumer inflation response to an interest rate shock:  Updating the 
monthly level estimation in Minella (2001) with the country risk premium included 
in the set of regressors. Sampled Period: 1994:09 to 2009:12 
 







Panel B: Quarterly estimation and responses 
 
 







Panel D: Quarterly estimation and responses with GDP and Nominal Exchange 
Rate Variation respectively replacing Industrial Production and Country Risk 
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Figure 17: Policy Exercise – Changing the Primary Surplus Target: Shock to the 
Monetary Policy Rule 
 
 
Figure 18: Policy Exercise – Changing the Reaction to the Debt-to-GDP Ratio in 
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Figure 19: Policy Exercise – Changing the Reaction to GDP Growth in the Fiscal 
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Figure 20: Policy Exercise – Changing the Reaction to GDP Growth in the 
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Figure 21: Policy Exercise – Changing the Size ( ) of the Worse-off Share of the Population: Shock to the Primary Surplus Rule 
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